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Double Elevation:  
Autonomous Weapons and the Search for an Irreducible Law of War 
Ioannis Kalpouzos* 
(forthcoming Leiden Journal of International Law (2020)) 
 
Abstract 
What should be the role of law in response to the spread of Artificial Intelligence in war? Fuelled by 
both public and private investment, military technology is accelerating towards increasingly 
autonomous weapons, as well as the merging of humans and machines. Contrary to much of the 
contemporary debate, this is not a paradigm change; it is the intensification of a central feature in the 
relationship between technology and war: double elevation, above one’s enemy and above oneself. 
Elevation above one’s enemy aspires to spatial, moral and civilizational distance. Elevation above 
oneself reflects a belief in rational improvement that sees humanity as the cause of inhumanity and de-
humanization as our best chance for humanization. The distance of double elevation is served by the 
mechanization of judgement. To the extent that judgement is seen as reducible to algorithm, law 
becomes the handmaiden of mechanization. In response, neither a focus on questions of compatibility 
nor a call for a ‘ban on killer robots’ help in articulating a meaningful role for law. Instead, I argue that 
we should turn to a long-standing philosophical critique of artificial intelligence, which highlights not 
the threat of omniscience, but that of impoverished intelligence. Therefore, if there is to be a 
meaningful role for law in resisting double elevation, it should be law encompassing subjectivity, 
emotion and imagination, law irreducible to algorithm, a law of war that appreciates situated judgement 
in the wielding of violence for the collective.  
Keywords 
Law of war; autonomous weapons; artificial intelligence; judgement; irreducible law 
 
1. Introduction 
 
We are experiencing an escalation of both hope and angst in relation to the socially 
transformative role of technology. Artificial intelligence is gradually colonising our daily 
lives as well as our perception of the future. Technological advance informs both the 
material and economic relations in society, with added investment through the public and 
private sectors,1 as well as pervasive intellectual and moral soul-searching. Attitudes range 
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from extreme optimism,2 or at least utopian engagement,3 to a range of voices and 
scholarship highlighting dangers or warning against a catastrophe.4  
In war, the above spectrum of stances on technology as a whole is both mirrored and 
intensified. Attitudes range from wild optimism about human perfectibility and the 
overcoming of human fallibility through artificial intelligence5 through pragmatic and 
productive adaptability6 to serious concerns about the de-humanization of war-fighting and 
the removal of the human beings from the proverbial loop.7  
The wild swings of technological optimism and pessimism have pedigree. From the biblical 
figure of the Golem8 and Hephaistos’ robots9 to Goethe’s sorcerer’s apprentice, man has 
fretted over the emancipation of his mechanical creations and the loss of control over his 
reified wishes, while striving to both physically and intellectually perfect and overcome his 
humanity through technology.10 Angst over the brave new world of robots, and its effect 
on the social,11 is a recurring affliction.12  
Now, a prodigious multi-disciplinary literature reckons with artificial intelligence, war and 
law, and specifically the development and deployment of what are referred to as 
increasingly, and eventually fully, “autonomous” weapons. Editorials abound, campaigns 
 
received by the Harvard Law School Institute of Global Law and Policy. At the final stage of writing I benefited from 
the detailed and insightful feedback from students, and my presentation, at the Harvard Law School’s International 
Law Workshop, as well as by the comments from Professors Gabriella Blum and William Alford. I am also grateful 
to the Leiden Journal’s editors and the anonymous reviewer.   
1 A. Campolo et al, AI Now 2017 Report, available at https://ainowinstitute.org/AI_Now_2017_Report.pdf; V. 
Boulanin, ‘Mapping the Innovation Ecosystem Driving the Advance of Autonomy in Weapon Systems’ SIPRI Working 
Paper, December 2016, 4 on DARPA’s outsourcing to private companies and Russia, China and Japan emulating.  
2 R. Kurzweil, The Singularity is Near: When Humans Transcend Biology (2005). See also the illuminating and entertaining 
reporting in M. O’Connell, To Be a Machine: Adventures among Cyborgs, Utopians, Hackers, and the Futurists Solving the Modest 
Problem of Death (2017).   
3 N. Srnicek and A. Williams, Demand full automation: Postcapitalism and a World without Work (2016).  
4 N. Bostrom, Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies (2014).  
5 R. C. Arkin, Governing Lethal Behavior in Autonomous Systems (2009) 
6 K. Anderson and M. Waxman, ‘Law and ethics for autonomous weapons systems: why a ban won’t work and how 
the laws of war can’, (2013) Stanford University, The Hoover Institution (Jean Perkins Task Force on National Security and Law 
Essay Series) 
7 See, for example, Human Rights Watch, ‘Losing Humanity: The Case Against Killer Robots’, 19 November 2012, 
available at www.hrw.org/report/2012/11/19/losing-humanity/case-against-killer-robots;; P. Asaro, ‘On banning 
autonomous weapons systems: human rights, automation and the dehumanization of lethal decision-making’, (2012) 
94 International Review of the Red Cross, 687. 
8 See E. Thorstensen, ‘Creating Golems: Uses of Golem Stories in the Ethics of Technologies’ (2017) 11(2) 
NanoEthics 153. 
9 S. Vasileiadou, D.Kalligeropoulos, ‘Myth, theory and technology of automatic control in ancient Greece’, 
Proceedings of the European Control Conference 2007 Kos, Greece, (July 2-5, 2007).  
10 O’Connell, supra note 2. 
11 Ibid, 104-7 on the etymology of the term ‘robot’ and Karel Capek’s 1921 play R.U.R. (Rossum’s Universal Robots).  
12 Fears of the effects of automation on the job market have featured, for example, in the covers of Der Spiegel magazine 
in March 1964, April 1978 and September 2016.   
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are launched to ‘stop killer robots’,13 and states assemble to debate their regulation and very 
existence.14  
This article intervenes in a rather crowded debate. Why is there such a flurry of current 
interest in autonomous weapons and their legal regulation? A visceral reaction to the idea 
of mechanised killing, combined with the perception of the acceleration of artificial 
intelligence research15 may be a sufficient answer. The anticipation of incoming practical 
problems to-be-solved, questions posed by powerful interested parties, may also be an 
incentive for lawyers to place their analyses in the marketplace of ideas.  
But I believe there is more to it. The present is the time to imagine the future, especially 
when one is both propelled by and unmoored from the past. The mix of artificial 
intelligence, war and law draws some of its headiness from a specific historical moment – 
a culmination of and a departure from enlightenment rationalism; the apex of progress and 
the moment when we fear it will get out of hand. ‘The end of the end of history’16 marks a 
daunting beginning.  
The law of war carries this tension, with respect to both the articulation of rules and their 
enforcement. The legal institution of war rests on the survival of a soldier’s individual sense 
of humanity at the time when his life is laid out for the collective. So does individual 
(criminal) liability: without that assumption –without that fiction – it makes no sense. I 
argue that the increasing mechanisation of warfare pursues the creation of distance from 
our enemies and from ourselves and reduces the knowledge and intelligence of the law and 
its application through individual judgement. I further argue that legal research on new 
weapons technology should focus less on questions of compatibility between given legal 
rules and the algorithmic and kinetic features of new weapons, as most current scholarship 
does, and more on an understanding of law as non-reducible to algorithmic engineering. 
I start, in section 2, by reviewing the state of the art-in-the-making. Rather than providing 
an exhaustive taxonomy I aim to highlight the teleological nature of Artificial Intelligence 
research and the industry’s investment in the dialectic of increasing machine autonomy and 
human/machine merging, or ‘merged heteronomy’. I then see, in section 3, this 
relationship between technology and war in some historical perspective, with a view to 
discerning functions relevant to law. I argue that the role of technology in war entails a 
double elevation: above one’s enemy and above oneself. The elevation above one’s enemy, 
 
13 See https://www.stopkillerrobots.org  
14 See, on the 2018 meeting of the Group of Government Experts, established by 2016 Fifth Review Conference of 
the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), and related documents,  
https://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/7C335E71DFCB29D1C1258243003E8724?OpenDocume
nt.   
15 See the profile and interview of Nick Bostrom in R Khatchadourian, ‘The Doomsday Invention: Will artificial 
intelligence bring us utopia or destruction?’ 23 November 2015, The New Yorker suggesting the pace of research has 
especially accelerated in the last six year. 
16 G. Simpson, ‘The end of the end of history: some epitaphs for liberalism’, (2016) 15(1) Baltic Journal of International Law 332-
43. 
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discussed in section 3.1, serves a both offensive and defensive impetus and aspires to both 
spatial and moral/civilizational distance. The elevation above oneself, discussed in section 
3.2, is for self-perfection. It is often associated with a certain understanding of Cartesian 
dualism and a belief in rational improvement that may see humanity as the cause of 
inhumanity and de-humanization as our best chance for humanization. It seeks to 
mechanize judgement and therefore establish a distance from human failings. It is served 
by war as governance from a distance and by the increasing physical and cognitive merging 
of humans and machines. Both physically and, to some extent, in moral and civilizational 
terms, technology and automation promise such improvement through establishing a 
distance from the human – our human enemy and our human self. The establishment of 
this distance entails a decreasing role for human judgement and the weakening of 
responsibility for such judgement. I further argue, in section 3.3, that law, or certain strands 
of mainstream jurisprudence, are complicit in such mechanization, to the extent that law is 
treated as logic even conceivably reducible to algorithm. And that the reaction against this 
process of distancing and de-humanization, to the extent that it idealises the proscriptive 
or regulatory role of law, is bound to disappoint.  
Finally, in section 4, I aim to begin articulating what the role of law, and legal scholarship, 
should be in response. I argue that, while responding to a justified angst, the calls for a ban 
are unlikely to succeed and may miss the target. I turn to long-standing philosophical and 
sociological critiques which starkly show the limitations of the cognitive theory 
underpinning Artificial Intelligence, its disembodied poverty. I argue, and conclude, that if 
there is to be a meaningful role for law and if we are not to mechanize and outsource our 
judgement we need to work towards an irreducible and situated understanding of the law 
of war, one that entails the appreciation of subjectivity and emotion, a law that cannot be 
coded.  
2. Towards full autonomy and merged heteronomy  
2.1 Defining technology in escalation 
 
This is an analysis of the present development of future technology. As such, it can be 
based on two parameters: the first is the observation of the trajectory of technological 
development, from the (recent) past to the present, including the present projections of 
technological expertise; the second relates to ‘our beliefs about what it means to be a 
human being in that future.’17 In this case as well, and if ‘[a]rmaments embody fantasies of 
future conflicts’,18 the discussion of the future is a discussion of the present – our present 
beliefs, understanding and projections on humanity and war-fighting. Accordingly, an 
 
17 G. Noll, ‘Weaponising neurotechnology: International humanitarian law and the loss of language’, (2014) 2(2) London 
Review of International Law 201, at 204. 
18 Ibid 204. See also L. Suchman, Human-Machine Reconfigurations: Plans and Situated Actions (2007) at 1: ‘cultural 
conceptions have material effects’. 
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analysis confined to finding or setting out conditions for ‘compatibility’ of future 
technology with present law or, conversely, arguing for the ‘adaptability’ of present law to 
encompass future technology, would be insufficient for both present and future purposes. 
To the extent that new weapons technologies reflect an on-going trend in technology, law 
and war, and to the extent that they constitute a qualitative leap, discussing them without 
critically assessing our present categories would be a crucial opportunity lost. Law and 
technology are in dialogue, in a relationship of mutual influence, and this is an already long 
and established relationship. An argument on the relationship between law and future 
technology, therefore, while appreciating projected material change, needs to be primarily 
an argument for the present and how to change, for the future, what is already here.  
Weapons technology is described in escalation towards an ultimate end: full autonomy. 
Teleological categorisation is applies, for example, to the qualities of ‘adaptiveness’19 or 
‘self-governance’20 and is reflected in the terminology used. At one end, the term 
‘automatic’ describes mechanical response to sensory input, without the ability to adapt to 
changes in the environment. One step further, the possibility to adapt, but alongside ‘a pre-
defined set of rules’ towards an outcome, is seen to describe ‘automated’ weapons. Finally, 
an autonomous weapon, or system, ‘is capable of understanding higher-level intent or 
direction…deciding a course of action, from a number of alternatives, without depending 
on human oversight or control, although these may still be present. Although the overall 
activity of an autonomous [system] will be predictable, individual actions may not be.’21 
The idea of autonomy dominates the analysis of weapons technology and its evolution. 
The increase in the autonomy of weapons is usually perceived as corresponding to the 
concomitant decrease of the role of individuals. The terminology of the human/machine 
command and control relationship accordingly ranges from the semi-autonomous or 
human in the loop (where human input is required during the weapons’ operation), through 
supervised autonomy or human on the loop (where an individual can intervene when 
something goes wrong), to fully autonomous or human out of the loop. Here the weapons 
systems ‘operate completely on their own and […] humans are not in a position to 
intervene’.22 Noel Sharkey has set out the level of the individual’s involvement in a useful 
– and widely used – five-part categorisation, which illustrates the combination of increasing 
weapon emancipation with decreasing human participation: 
1. Human engages with and selects target and initiates any attack; 
2. Program suggests alternative targets and human chooses which to attack; 
 
19 See G. Sartor and A. Omicini, ‘The autonomy of technological systems and responsibilities for their use’ in N. Bhuta 
et al, Autonomous Weapons Systems: Law, Ethics, Policy (2016), 39, at 49: ‘an autonomous system must have the capacity 
to modify itself in order to better align its behaviour to its intended purposes in the context in which it operates.’  
20 ‘[T]he degree of autonomy is often measured by relating the degree at which the environment can be varied to the 
mean time between failures, and other factors indicative of robot performance.’ S. Thrun, ‘Toward a framework for 
human-robot interaction’, (2004) 19(1) Human-Computer Interaction, 9–24, at 14. 
21 D. Mindell, Our Robots, Ourselves: Robotics and the Myths of Autonomy (2015), at 12. 
22 V. Boulanin ‘Mapping the Development of Autonomy in Weapon Systems: A Primer on Autonomy’ SIPRI Working 
Paper, December 2016, at 12.  
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3. Program selects target and human must approve before attack; 
4. Program selects target and human has restricted time to veto; 
5. Program selects target and initiates attack without human involvement.23  
The evolution of autonomy is piecemeal, a process of filling in gaps, an increasing 
accumulation of different skills towards full functional and operational autonomy. In the 
meantime, it is possible for a weapon to have full autonomy in terms of identifying and 
engaging a target but no autonomy in kinetic terms. Within a specific task, even if a weapon 
has full autonomy in, for example, identification and engagement, this may be supported 
by a very basic level of cognitive sophistication. A landmine, indeed, satisfies the above 
examples, providing no kinetic autonomy, full engagement autonomy and very limited 
cognitive capacity.24 There may be full autonomy in some aspects of behaviour and not in 
others.  
When it comes to the representation and application of behavioural, and legal, rules, 
cognitive autonomy is seen as crucial. It is teleological,25 insofar as the system combines 
representational structures for ‘belief-desire-intentions (BDI)’.26 Such a system ‘[i]n order 
to realize its desires (goals), […]constructs plans of action on the basis of its model of the 
relevant facts (beliefs) and commits itself to act according to the chosen plans 
(intentions).’27 For Sartor and Omicini ‘only teleological systems can be fully endowed with 
the capacity to be guided by norms, as elements that play a specific role in the deliberative 
process of such systems.’28 Such independent, adaptive and purposeful machine agents can 
exist independently or within ‘artificial agent societies’,29 which in weapons systems have 
often been referred to as ‘swarms’.30 
“Fully autonomous systems” then, in relation to warfighting, are systems that, once 
deployed, are able to adapt, receive and process feedback, and display a level of functional 
autonomy that effectively does not distinguish them from human decision makers.31 If 
 
23 N. Sharkey, ‘Staying in the loop: human supervisory control of weapons’ in N. Bhuta et al, Autonomous Weapons 
Systems: Law, Ethics, Policy (2016), 23, at 27. See also N. Sharkey, ‘Towards a Principle for the Human Supervisory 
Control of Robot Weapons’, (2014) 2 Politica e Società, 305, at 316. Sharkey believes that only the first two levels could 
be morally justified. See also Report of the 2018 session of the Group of Governmental Experts on Emerging 
Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, par. 23. 
24 Sartor and Omicini, supra note 19, at 44-8.   
25 For an early analysis related with the origins of artificial intelligence and linked to the theory of cybernetics discussed 
further below, see A. Rosenblueth, N. Wiener and J. Bigelow, ‘Behavior, Purpose and Teleology’, (1943) 10(1) 
Philosophy of Science, 18. 
26 For the term and a theory of ‘formalisation of intentions’ see A. S. Rao and M. P. Georgeff, ‘Modelling rational 
agents within a BDI architecture’ in J. Allen et al, Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning: Proceedings of the Second 
International Conference (1991). 
27 Sartor and Omicini, supra note 19, at 51. 
28 Ibid, 52.  
29 See e.g. S. Ossowski, Co-ordination in Artificial Agent Societies: Social Structures and Its Implications for Autonomous Problem-
Solving Agents (1999). 
30 See P. Scharre, Robotics on the Battlefield Part II: The Coming Swarm (Oct. 2014); M. Rubenstein et al, ‘Programmable 
Self-Assembly in a Thousand-Robot Swarm’, (2014) 345, Science, 795. 
31 See also C. Heyns, ‘Autonomous weapons systems: living a dignified life and dying a dignified death’ in N. Bhuta et 
al, Autonomous Weapons Systems: Law, Ethics, Policy (2016), 3, at 4. J. D. Ohlin, ‘The Combatant Stance: Autonomous 
Weapons on the Battlefield’, (2016) 92 International Law Studies 1 on ‘functional autonomy’. The idea of functional 
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anything, in fact – and that is really the point – such systems may be capable of a higher 
level of tactical or even strategic decision-making (cognitive) and war-fighting (kinetic) 
capacity. This seems to be a shared understanding among states and NGOs, otherwise 
holding different positions in the autonomous weapons debate. Accordingly, the US 
Department of Defense refers to ‘[a] weapons system that, once activated, can select and 
engage targets without further intervention by a human operator’.32 Human Rights Watch, 
while setting out its position against autonomous weapons systems, defines them as 
‘[r]obots that are capable of selecting targets and delivering force without any human input 
or interaction’.33 Other states34 and organisations35 provide similar definitions. These 
functions of autonomy, and their escalation, entail both physical and cognitive distancing 
from human agents in the overall process of targeting.  
Although the concept and image of autonomy dominates the discourse in a way that 
influences, as we will see in the next chapter, much of the scientific research and 
development, it only partially describes technological escalation. In fact, the AI of war-
fighting complements increasing autonomy with what has been called ‘merged 
heteronomy’. Increasing cognitive autonomy, and distance, coexists with increasingly close 
physical proximity. This serves pragmatic aims: Technological limitations in the fragmented 
development of different aspects of autonomy, the continuing necessity of human input 
and the fragility of human/machine networks mean that the individual’s continuing 
presence in the loop remains an operational necessity. This also means that a full-on 
confrontation with social and political resistance to the reality of distinct ‘killer robots’ is 
placed in abeyance. Continuous, if vague, assurances of the human remaining ‘in the loop’ 
and retaining ‘meaningful control’ are thereby facilitated.  
And yet, the abeyance is a trap and our presence ‘in the loop’ is no guarantee. To the extent 
that ‘full autonomy’ is understood to require the separate physical existence of an, often 
anthropomorphised, robot other, it obscures the crucial role that increasing cognitive 
autonomy plays in a nominally heteronomous decision-making process. Cognitively, as well 
as physically and kinetically, humans and machines become decreasingly separate, less and 
less other. Their understanding of the rules, the nomos, is merging, as is their physical 
existence. Increasing autonomy and merged heteronomy serve the same purpose, the same 
 
autonomy of course hails from Turing’s ‘imitation game’. See A.M. Turing, ‘Computing Machinery and Intelligence’, 
(1950) Mind: A Quarterly Review of Psychology and Philosophy 433.  
32 United States Department of Defense, Directive No 3000.09 Autonomy in Weapon Systems (21 November 2012) 
Glossary. 
33 Human Rights Watch, ‘Losing Humanity: The Case Against Killer Robots (November 2012) 
34 Examination of various dimensions of emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapons systems, 
in the context of the objectives and the purposes of the Convention, submitted by the Netherlands, 
CCW/GGE.1/2017/WP.2, 9 October 2017. 
35 Geneva Academy, Autonomous Weapon Systems under International Law (Academy Briefing no. 8, November 2014) 6 
available at https://www.geneva-academy.ch/joomlatools-files/docman-
files/Publications/Academy%20Briefings/Autonomous%20Weapon%20Systems%20under%20International%20L
aw_Academy%20Briefing%20No%208.pdf. 
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teleology of mechanisation. ‘The loop’, itself, is changing, increasingly relying on artificial 
intelligence. 
2.2 The state of the art-in-the-making 
 
The escalating aspirations of full autonomy, in combination with merged heteronomy, can 
be seen in both existing and projected weapons technology.36 At this stage, increasing 
autonomy is more confidently deployed and developed in defensive weapons systems or 
in surveillance and evidence gathering technology. There are operational weapons 
technologies of a defensive nature that employ a level of autonomous decision making.37 
The Goalkeeper close-in weapon system used by the Dutch and other navies, already 
developed in 1979 and now produced by Thales, operates two radar sub-systems which 
identify up to 18 targets at once, tracks, prioritises and engages them, using an ‘identify 
friend or foe’ (IFF) system.38 The Quick Kill active protection system, designed for the US 
army, automatically tracks and destroys anti-tank missiles.39 An existing weapon displaying 
a significant degree of automation, if not kinetically emancipated, is the Super aEgis II, an 
anti-personnel sentry weapon system manufactured by South Korean DoDAMM. The 
turret gun uses thermal imaging to offer an autonomous detection, tracking and targeting 
capacity of vehicle or human targets within a 3k range.40 The weapon, currently operating 
in the Korean Demilitarized Zone, has the option of operating on a fully automated mode, 
although it is currently held on a ‘slave’ mode, with an individual in the loop.41  
Offensive weapons employing elements of autonomy range from long-range anti-ship 
smart missiles (LRASM) to the Harpy loitering munitions. The LRASM, manufactured by 
Lockheed Martin, the first batch delivered in December 2018,42 is a long-range, precision-
guided anti-ship missile, which may chart its course both in accordance with pre-routing as 
well as autonomously, in order ‘to find and destroy its pre-determined target in denied 
 
36 For a number of examples, see also D. Lewis, G. Blum and N. Modirzadeh, War-Algorithm Accountability (Harvard 
Law School Program on International Law and Armed Conflict), August 2016, at 34 et seq.  
37 See generally Boulanin, supra note 22, at 26.   
38 See https://www.thalesgroup.com/en/goalkeeper-close-weapon-system# and 
https://www.defencetalk.com/thales-to-upgrade-dutch-navy-goalkeepers-45747/  
39 See https://www.raytheon.com/capabilities/products/aps/: ‘The Quick Kill system consists of a multi-mission, 
fire-control radar that detects and tracks incoming threats, combined with hard-kill countermeasures that serve as a 
hit avoidance system, enabling multi-tracking and simultaneous multi-engagement of enemy fire for vehicle and squad 
protection.’ See also the Israeli Trophy, developed by Raphael, and a comparison at 
http://raytheon.mediaroom.com/index.php?item=2251: ‘The Quick Kill system consists of a multi-mission, fire-
control radar that detects and tracks incoming threats, combined with hard-kill countermeasures that serve as a hit 
avoidance system, enabling multi-tracking and simultaneous multi-engagement of enemy fire for vehicle and squad 
protection.’ 
40 See http://www.dodaam.com/eng/sub2/menu2_1_4.php  
41 See also Samsung’s SGR-1 sentry robots at http://www.defensereview.com/samsung-sgr-a1-armedweaponized-
robot-sentry-or-sentry-robot-remote-weapons-station-rws-finally-ready-for-prime-time/ 
42 See https://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/lockheed-martin-delivers-first-long-range-anti-ship-454597/ 
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environments.’43 Loitering munitions are disposable unmanned combat vehicles, also 
known as ‘kamikaze drones’, targeted at an overall area, where they loiter until they can 
find and strike specific ground targets.44 While most are currently operated by human 
agents who ‘close the (sensor-to-shooter) circuit and hit the target’,45 according to Maj. 
Gen. (res.) Gadi Shamni, Head of Israeli Aerospace Industries’ Land Systems Division, 
current technology ‘may be operated without human involvement, and such involvement 
will only depend on the fire employment guidelines that are based on non-technological 
considerations.’46   
Ongoing research and development aimed at increasing autonomous kinetic ability is 
crucially complemented by the investment in the capacity to survey, identify and engage 
potential targets. Project Maven47 introduced artificial intelligence and machine learning 
innovations to intelligence, surveillance and target acquisition (ISR), and integrated it into 
the battlefield. Massive amounts of data, the product of drone surveillance, are analysed 
for the identification of objects and potential targets. Machine learning sprints are 
developing the algorithm.48 This allows both the classification of images for the US military 
and the rapid improvement of the program. While Project Maven spokespeople assuage 
concerns by confirming that individuals are the ones reviewing the algorithms’ 
classifications and selecting the potential targets and that Maven has not been used for 
specific targeting decisions, the algorithms are tested live integrating the combat theatre, 
rather than in a lab environment. In the combat theatre, presumably, computer identified 
objects are actioned. At the same time the algorithm is constantly learning, increasingly 
ready for fuller autonomy.49  
Maven was just the beginning.50 The newly released US Department of Defense (DoD) 
Artificial Intelligence Strategy51 is creating a new Joint Artificial Intelligence Centre (JAIC), 
 
43 See https://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/products/LRASM/overview.html and 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h449oIjg2kY  
44 Boulanin, supra note 22, at 50-55. See also https://www.newsweek.com/drones-suicide-kamikaze-war-
assassination-missile-uav-war-1340751 
45 See http://www.israeldefense.co.il/en/content/loitering-munitions-alter-battlefield 
46 See http://www.israeldefense.co.il/en/node/31130 
47 Pellerin, ‘Project Maven Industry Day Pursues Artificial Intelligence for DoD Challenges’, DoD News, 27 October 
2017, available at www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1356172/project-maven-industry-day-pursues-artificial-
intelligence-for-dod-challenges/ 
48 On the role of the sprints see Deputy Secretary of Defense’s Memorandum on the Establishment of an Algorithmic 
Warfare Cross-Functional Team (Project Maven), 26 April 2017, available at 
www.govexec.com/media/gbc/docs/pdfs_edit/establishment_of_the_awcft_project_maven.pdf and D. Lewis, N. 
Modirzadeh, and G. Blum, ‘The Pentagon’s New Algorithmic-Warfare Team, Lawfare, 26 June 2017 available at 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/pentagons-new-algorithmic-warfare-team 
49 The DoD’s Algorithmic Warfare Cross-functional Team (AWCFT)’s “objective is to turn the enormous data 
available to DoD into actionable intelligence and insights at speed.” See Deputy Secretary of Defense’s Memorandum 
on the Establishment of an Algorithmic Warfare Cross-Functional Team (Project Maven), 26 April 2017, available at 
www.govexec.com/media/gbc/docs/pdfs_edit/establishment_of_the_awcft_project_maven.pdf  
50 See https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2018/06/general-project-maven-just-beginning-militarys-use-
ai/149363/ 
51 Summary of the 2018 US Department of Defense Artificial Intelligence Strategy released 12 February 2019 and 
available at https://media.defense.gov/2019/Feb/12/2002088963/-1/-1/1/SUMMARY-OF-DOD-AI-
STRATEGY.PDF (US DoD AI Strategy) 
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a DoD priority,52 headed by Lt. Gen. Jack Shanahan, the head of Project Maven. The aims 
of Maven are at the heart of current US research, which is focusing especially on image 
analysis,53 ‘improving the capabilities of sensing algorithms for autonomous surveillance 
and targeting’,54 including through stealth technology for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 
(drones), enabling them to operate autonomously in ‘communication-denied airspace’ for 
the purposes of both surveillance and targeting.55 The image recognition automation is not 
limited to non-human objects, but includes focus on facial recognition software, some 
research focusing on ‘probabilistic algorithms th[at] determine the likelihood of adversarial 
intent’,56 reflecting the increasing influence of a criminal law paradigm on the law of 
targeting.  
Similar trends may be observed in human/machine technologies. Kinetic autonomy, such 
as ‘Fast Lightweight Autonomy’,57 is combined with the development of natural language 
processing for human-machine communication.58 Cognitive autonomy, such as the 
‘probabilistic programming for advanced machine learning’,59 is sought alongside the ability 
of AI systems to ‘explain themselves’ and earn the trust of human beings;60 and the 
collaboration of autonomous agents amongst themselves,61 or under the control of a 
reduced number of human operators.62 “[S]warm squadrons of network enabled drones”, 
are, according to the former UK Defence Secretary, part of “the future direction of the 
 
52 Memorandum on the Establishment of Joint Artificial Intelligence Centre, 27 June 2018, available at 
https://admin.govexec.com/media/establishment_of_the_joint_artificial_intelligence_center_osd008412-18_r....pdf 
53 US DoD AI Strategy p. 11. See also on the priority of the automation in geolocation M. Ekelhof, Lifting the Fog 
of Targeting: “Autonomous Weapons” and Human Control through the Lens of Military Targeting (2018) 71(3) Naval 
War College Review, 61, 80 and fn 107 reporting an interview with NGA technical director and big-data specialist. 
54 Boulanin, supra note 22, at 17. DARPA’s TRACE program is described thus: “The Target Recognition and Adaption 
in Contested Environments (TRACE) program seeks to develop an accurate, real-time, low-power target recognition 
system that can be co-located with the radar to provide responsive long-range targeting for tactical airborne 
surveillance and strike applications.” See https://www.darpa.mil/program/trace See also the modestly called ‘Imaging 
Through Almost Anything Anywhere (ITA3)’ program here: https://www.darpa.mil/program/fast-lightweight-
autonomy 
55 Lockheed Martin in the US, BAE Systems (Taranis Programme), and Dassault and Saab (Neuron Programme). See 
also M. Maas et al, Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Defense: Strategic Implications For Small- and Medium-Sized Force 
Providers (2017), at 44 et seq. 
56 See the press release at http://www.modusoperandi.com/modus-operandi-awarded-1-million-u-s-army-contract-
for-enemy-and-criminal-behavioral-recognition-system/  
57 ‘The goal of the FLA program is to explore non-traditional perception and autonomy methods that could enable a 
new class of algorithms for minimalistic high-speed navigation in cluttered environments. Through this exploration, 
the program aims to develop and demonstrate the capability for small (i.e., able to fit through windows) autonomous 
UAVs to fly at speeds up to 20 m/s (45 mph) with no communication links to the operator and without GPS guidance.’ 
https://www.darpa.mil/program/fast-lightweight-autonomy 
58 See DARPA’s project ‘Communicating with Computers’ (CwC) which is introduced thus: ‘The [CwC] program aims 
to enable symmetric communication between people and computers in which machines are not merely receivers of 
instructions but collaborators, able to harness a full range of natural modes including language, gesture and facial or 
other expressions. For the purposes of the CwC program, communication is understood to be the sharing of complex 
ideas in collaborative contexts.’ https://www.darpa.mil/program/communicating-with-computers   
59 https://www.darpa.mil/program/probabilistic-programming-for-advancing-machine-Learning 
60 ‘The [Explainable Artificial Intelligence] program will focus the development of multiple systems on addressing 
challenges problems in two areas: (1) machine learning problems to classify events of interest in heterogeneous, 
multimedia data; and (2) machine learning problems to construct decision policies for an autonomous system to 
perform a variety of simulated missions.’ https://www.darpa.mil/program/explainable-artificial-intelligence 
61 See the Micro Autonomous Systems Technology (MAST) research program at  http://www.mast-cta.org/ 
62 Boulanin, supra note 22, at 17. 
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UK armed forces”.63 Such research aspires to achieve the crucial goal of strengthening 
network contact in complex human/machine systems, towards their further integration.  
Finally, while the Tactical Assault Light Operator Suit (TALOS) project, colloquially 
referred to as the Iron Man suit, failed, individual components will be used64 and it 
represents a clear, if spectacular, statement as to the intended future of heteronomy 
merging so completely that the distinction between human and machine will increasingly 
disappear. The suit would be a computerized exoskeleton that would increase both physical 
and cognitive performance offering “increased survivability, lethality, situational awareness 
and decreased time to target engagement”.65 The development of Brain-Computer 
Interface (BCI) is at the heart of DARPA’s latest call for an Intelligent Neural Interfaces 
program, aiming at “modeling and maximizing the information content of biological neural 
circuits to increase the bandwidth and computational abilities of the neural interface.”66 
Cognitive enhancement will be achieved by integrating human and artificial intelligence.67 
The dialectic of autonomy and merged heteronomy is supported by powerful 
socioeconomic forces. The new US DoD AI strategy expressly, and insistently, seeks to 
integrate both academic and commercial actors in the development of future weapons 
technology.68 Embracing artificial intelligence is seen as a holistic national, social and 
economic endeavour; a cultural aspiration.69 The relationship of Google with Project 
Maven is indicative of the enthusiasm, the tension and the eventual “synergy” between the 
military and private commercial actors. An initial embrace,70 including the use of 
unsuspecting “gig” workers to “feed the algorithm”71 and the license for corporations to 
own the intellectual property of the improved algorithm, led to a high-profile employee 
reaction and Google’s divestment,72 while the future relationship remains open.73 While the 
 
63 For the UK defence minister’s statement on developing swarms see 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/defence-in-global-britain  and https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-
politics-47192232.  
64 See https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2019/02/us-military-chopping-its-iron-man-suit-parts/154706/ 
65 See https://www.socom.mil/Pages/SOF-AT-L-Seeks-Industry-Partners-for-Future-TALOS-Innovations.aspx 
66 See 
https://www.fbo.gov/index?s=opportunity&mode=form&id=f48385e64664e78b061032cd12b86db5&tab=core&_
cview=0 
67 See also Y. Sankai and T. Sakurai, ‘Exoskeletal cyborg-type robot’ (2018) 3(17) Science Robotics.  
68 US DoD AI Strategy p. 12 referring to “bold new AI initiatives with large industrial partners, small start-ups, and 
venture capital firms.” 
69 The DoD’s reference to its own culture reflects a broader culture of business and risk. See US DoD AI Summary 
p. 14: “We are building a culture that welcomes and rewards appropriate risk-taking to push the art of the possible: 
rapid learning by failing quickly, early, and on a small scale.”   
70 See S. Gibbs, Google’s AI is being used by US military drone program, 7 March 2018, The Guardian, available at 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/mar/07/google-ai-us-department-of-defense-military-drone-
project-maven-tensorflow  
71 L. Fang, Google hires gig economy workers to improve artificial intelligence in controversial drone-targeting 
program, 4 February 2019, The Intercept, available at https://theintercept.com/2019/02/04/google-ai-project-maven-
figure-eight/ 
72 See D. Wakabayashi and S. Shane, Google will not review contract that upset employees, 1 June 2018, Thew New 
York Times, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/01/technology/google-pentagon-project-maven.html 
73 L. Fang, Google hedges on promise to end controversial involvement in military drone contract, 1 March 2019, The 
Intercept at https://theintercept.com/2019/03/01/google-project-maven-contract/ 
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US has been the most transparent, or even outspoken,74 the public/private model that the 
US has pioneered is being emulated in, for example, Russia, China75 and Turkey.76  
States’ positions on the degree of weapons emancipation reflect the tension between the 
technological urge and remaining taboos. They are, accordingly, somewhat vague or open 
to change. The current U.S. position is set out in the Department of Defense Directive 
3000.09 which requires autonomous weapons systems to have the ‘capability to allow 
commanders and operators to exercise appropriate levels of human judgment in the use of 
force…’77 and sees the research described above, including Project Maven, as below this 
threshold.78 The UK has stated that its current research will make sure that individuals 
remain ‘in the loop’.79 Other states are unapologetic in allowing themselves flexibility.80  
What we are witnessing is the gradual identification and assembling of different aspects of 
autonomous capacity, while, with ‘full autonomy’ in abeyance, human judgement ‘in the 
loop’ is increasingly mechanised through human-machine merging. Both parts of this 
dialectic contribute to the mechanisation and distancing of the decision-making process 
 
74 See Boulanin, supra note 22 and Appendix C for a list of corporations.   
75 See E. Kania, Battlefield Singularity: Artificial Intelligence, Military Revolution, and China’s Future Military Power 
(28 November 2017) available at https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/battlefield-singularity-artificial-
intelligence-military-revolution-and-chinas-future-military-power 
76 ‘Turkish air defense and software company HAVELSAN will introduce a state-of-the-art defense system that will 
incorporate the use of artificial intelligence to recognize faces and license plates to gather data and personal 
information to prevent terrorist attacks. All photos and personal information of a suspected terrorist will be scanned 
and searched for, and security authorities will make sure if an arrest warrant was previously issued for the suspect. The 
system will be able to analyze the symmetry of the suspect's face, the retina and the ratio of the eyes, nose and 
eyebrows, and it will also be able to prepare an analysis on how the suspect walks. The system will automatically alarm 
security authorities if need be. All these processes will be completed without human activity.’ See 
https://www.dailysabah.com/war-on-terror/2017/10/02/military-to-utilize-artificial-intelligence-for-
counterterrorism  
77 US DoD Directive 3000.09, 21 November 2012, available at https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=726163. For the 
‘troubling lacunae’ of the Directive, see D. Saxon, A human touch: autonomous weapons, DoD Directive 3000.09 
and the interpretation of ‘appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of force’ in N. Bhuta et al, Autonomous 
Weapons Systems: Law, Ethics, Policy (2016), 185. 
78 This is reiterated, but not significantly elaborated, in the DoD’s AI strategy, p 15. But see the interview with head 
of the JAIC Jack Shanahan in M. Ekelhof, Lifting the Fog of Targeting: “Autonomous Weapons” and Human Control 
through the Lens of Military Targeting (2018) 71(3) Naval War College Review, 61, 85 and fn. 131 where he allows that 
‘it could very well be that, if a major conflict arises, all bets will be off, with states feeling forced into more reliance on 
autonomous systems because their adversaries are willing to take more risk.” 
79 The UK ministry of defence stated: “UK policy is that the operation of weapons will always be under control as an 
absolute guarantee of human oversight, authority and accountability. The UK does not possess fully autonomous 
weapon systems and has no intention of developing them.” See M. Savage, ‘Humans will always control killer drones, 
says ministry of defence’, The Observer, 10 September 2017, available at 
www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/sep/09/drone-robot-military-human-control-uk-ministry-defence-policy 
However, a previous commander of the UK Joint Forces Command has expressed his scepticism that such pledges 
will be maintained. See B. Farmer, ‘Prepare for rise of 'killer robots' says former defence chief’, The Daily 
Telegraph, 27 August 2017, available at www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/08/27/prepare-rise-killer-robots-says-
former-defence-chief/  
80 See Russian statements linked to the 2017 CCW review conference.: https://admin.govexec.com/media/russia.pdf 
: “the need to address humanitarian concerns cannot be used as the one and only sufficient prerequisite for imposing 
restrictive and prohibitive regimes on certain weapons.” The latest CCW Report, however, among its ‘possible guiding 
principles’ provides that ‘Human responsibility for decisions on the use of weapons systems must be retained since 
accountability cannot be transferred to machines.’ See Report of the 2018 session of the Group of Governmental 
Experts on Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, par. 21. 
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that involves legal judgement. This distancing, which I call ‘double elevation’, will now be 
placed in its historical perspective, with a view to begin thinking the future role of 
international law.  
 
3. Double elevation and the distancing of judgement 
 
Technology is not neutral.81 Assuming the neutrality of technology – and attaching to it the 
assumed neutrality of law – precludes any critical understanding of either. Indeed, 
technology’s posited neutrality is a harness we need to start without.82 Technology, its 
development and use, reflects both theoretical and practical commitments: ‘Technology at 
present is covert philosophy; the point is to make it openly philosophical.’83 It is also deeply 
political84 and it exists in a relationship of co-production with culture, politics and law.85 As 
Paul Edwards put it in a seminal study of Cold War weapons technology, ‘we can make 
sense of the history of computers as tools only when we simultaneously grasp their roles 
as metaphors in …[the period’s]… science, politics and culture.’86  Military technology 
shapes and reflects politics in a very particular manner87 and its history is instructive of its 
promises and purpose.    
In this section, I argue that the promise of technological progress and automation in war, 
as in general, is a promise of civilisation, a promise of improvement. It entails a double 
elevation: above one’s enemy and above one’s self. At the centre of it there is a paradoxical 
assumption, namely that the non-human can be more humane than the human. The 
elevation above one’s enemy combines military distance with a perception of civilizational 
and moral superiority. The elevation above oneself aims at creating a distance from human 
features perceived as weak or unreliable. Both full autonomy and merged heteronomy 
 
81 P. Vermaas et al, A Philosophy of Technology: From Technical Artefacts to Sociotechnical Systems (2011), at 16 refer to the 
well-known National Rifle Association slogan: ‘Guns don’t kill people. People kill people’ as an example of a ‘succinct 
way of summarising what is known as the neutrality thesis of technical artefacts.’ See also J.C. Pitt, Thinking about 
Technology: Foundations of the Philosophy of Technology (2000). 
82 See “Everywhere we remain unfree and chained to technology, whether we passionately affirm or deny it. But we 
are delivered over to it in the worst possible way when we regard it as something neutral” M. Heidegger, ‘The Question 
Concerning Technology’ in Basic Writings (2008 [1954]), 217, at 217. 
83 P. Agre, Computation and Human Experience (1997) at 240. 
84 Wiebe E. Bijker, ‘Why and How Technology Matters’ in R.E. Goodin and C. Tilly (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of 
Contextual Political Analysis (2006), 681. 
85 See, more broadly, S. Jasanoff (ed.), States of Knowledge: The Co-Production of Science and the Social Order (2004); S. Jasanoff, 
‘Technology as a Site and Object of Politics’ in R.E. Goodin and C. Tilly (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Contextual 
Political Analysis (2006), 745; W.E. Bijker, T.P. Hughes, and T. Pinch, The Social Construction of Technology (1993); Wim 
A. Smit, ‘Military Technologies and Politics’ in R.E. Goodin and C. Tilly (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Contextual 
Political Analysis (2006) 722 at 726: “there is not a “one way impact,” neither from military technological developments 
on politics and political analysis, nor vice versa. The influence is one of mutual shaping,[…]the co-evolution of military 
technology and both politics and political analysis” 
86 P. Edwards, The Closed World: Computers and the Politics of Discourse in Cold War America (1997), at ix.  
87 Ibid, chapter 2.  
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require the increasing mechanization of human judgement. What we have learned to 
understand as the civilisation of war-fighting rests on and pursues its mechanization.  
 
3.1 Rising above one’s enemy 
 
Technological distancing aims at developing asymmetry and invulnerability and elevating 
oneself above one’s enemy in both strictly speaking military and broader civilizational 
terms. The latter type of elevation allows not simply a geographical distance but also a 
moral distance with significant consequences for the role of law and judgement in killing. 
Military technology is central to early imperialist expansion,88 and its concomitant 
civilizational pretension, culminating in the steep military and moral asymmetry achieved 
in 19th century colonial warfare. Churchill’s description in the context of the Boer war of 
the British infantry ‘steadily and solidly’ firing against the Sudanese Dervishes in ‘the most 
signal triumph ever gained by the arms of science over barbarians’, while ‘the mere physical 
act became tedious’,89 is illustrative. Technology allows military superiority, guaranteeing 
the physical safety and invulnerability of one’s forces; the asymmetry achieved reflects an 
already assumed civilizational distance which allows a moral dissociation from the act of 
killing, expressed in the ennui of physical exertion; the civilisation of the technologically 
advanced party is enforced.90  
The role of military technology in the elevation above one’s enemy is most closely 
associated with the growth of air power and the aspirations of invulnerability associated 
with it. Air power, especially in situations of colonial asymmetry, constituted a relationship 
of vertical distance, allowing the surveillance and policing of one’s inferior enemy, both at 
initial conquest and through the protracted practice of colonial administration and 
pacification.91 That colonial relationship achieved new technological heights in the context 
of the Cold War. Towards the end of the 1960s, the Vietnam impasse pushed for the 
assertion of asymmetry through the development of an automated battlefield to improve 
targeting capacity,92 and protect American soldiers.93 Operation Igloo White attempted the 
 
88 G. Parker, The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West1500-1800 (1996). C.M. Cipolla, Guns, Sails, 
and Empires: Technological Innovation and the Early Phases of European Expansion, 1400–1700 (1988). 
89 Winston Churchill, The River War: An Account of the Reconquest of the Soudan (1899) in D.R. Headrick, The Tools of Empire 
(1981) at 118. 
90 See also T. Asad, On Suicide Bombing (2007), 34: ‘The modern Western army is concerned with engaging efficiently 
with dangerous, because underdeveloped, peoples, in ways that are at once ruthless and humane, in which brutal attack 
may become a civilizing sign.’ 
91 C. Munro, ‘Mapping the Vertical Battlespace: Towards a legal cartography of aerial sovereignty’ (2014) 2(2) London 
Review of International Law 233–61; D. Gregory, ‘From a View to a Kill: Drones and Late Modern War’, (2011) 28(7-8), 
188. Theory, Culture & Society; S. Moyn, ‘Drones and Imagination: A Response to Paul Kahn’, (2013) 24(1) EJIL 227. 
92 B. Hacker, ‘The Machines of War: Western Military Technology 1850–2000’, (2006) 21(3) History and Technology 255. 
93 See G. Chamayou, Drone Theory (2015) 21-22 citing a study of ‘remote control in hostile environments’ by J Clark, 
in 1964, finding that ‘consciousness is transferred to an unvulnerable mechanical body [and s]pace is divided into two: 
a hostile area and a safe one.’ 
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surveillance of the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos through the use of camouflaged sensors 
designed to detect different types of human activity, including body heat, vehicle noise or 
the smell of human urine,94 or sweat.95 When picked up, such activities appeared on the 
screens in the HQ’s terminals in Thailand and fed into the targeting system of military 
aircraft. A ‘kill box’96 was constructed and targeted. The operation’s ‘centralized, 
computerized, automated method of ‘interdiction’ relied on an active global defence and 
aspirations for the full automation of the battlefield. These are set out by General William 
Westmoreland, the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army at the time, in a tenor strongly evocative 
of our present debate:  
On the battlefield of the future, enemy forces will be located, tracked, and targeted 
almost instantaneously through the use of data links, computer assisted intelligence 
evaluation, and automated fire control. . . . I see battlefields on which we can destroy 
anything we locate through instant communications and the almost instantaneous 
application of highly lethal firepower… [A]n improved communicative system. . . 
would permit commanders to be continually aware of the entire battlefield 
panorama down to squad and platoon level.... I am confident the American people 
expect this country to take full advantage of its technology- to welcome and applaud 
the developments that will replace wherever possible the man with the machine. . .  
With cooperative effort, no more than 10 years should separate us from the 
automated battlefield.97 
 
As it turns out, Operation Igloo White was a complete failure.98 And yet the technological 
ambition remained. In 1973 the New Scientist echoed General Westmoreland’s 
technological/military optimism. There was ‘at present, great interest in the development 
of remotely piloted vehicles (RPV’s) for missions such as reconnaissance, electronic 
warfare, ground attack and air-to-air combat.’99 Increasingly, to these purposes was added 
another: targeted assassination.  
The ambition of the precision of a self-sustaining intelligence/targeting loop in drone 
warfare illustrates the confluence of offensive and defensive imperatives in elevating 
oneself above one’s enemy. Markus Gunneflo has shown how the practice of and legal 
justification for targeted killings was developed in Israeli and United States policy as a 
means of constitutional protection of the citizens to be distinguished from unlawful 
 
94 A. Jaubert, ‘Zapping the Viet Cong by Computer’, New Scientist, 30 March 1972, at 685, 687, available at 
books.google.co.uk/books?id=juOOP4nRFrQC&lpg=PP1&hl=EN&pg=PP1#v=onepage&q&f=false. 
95 The ‘People Sniffer’ “sensitive to infinitesimal quantities of ammonia, can detect human perspiration from a 
considerable distance.” See ibid. 688. 
96 Cf G Chamayou, Drone Theory (2015), chapter 6. . 
97 Address by General W.C. Westmoreland, chief of staff, US Army, Annual Luncheon Association of the United 
States Army, Sheraton Park Hotel, Washington, DC, 14 October 1969 (Congressional Record, US Senate, 16 October 
1969).   
98 Edwards, supra note 86, at 7. 
99 Dr Frank Barnaby, ‘Towards tactical infallibility’ 10 May 1973 New Scientist 348-54, 351. 
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assassination.100 In such ‘active defence’, especially when exercised globally, we see the 
merging of the offensive distance of air power, seeking to impose a vertical relationship of 
war, and the defensive distance of integrated human/machine surveillance systems.  
This vision is also reflected in the prioritization in the 1990s of drone research.101 Drones, 
both the surveillance and the targeting kind, have been seen as symbolising a ‘change of 
paradigm’ in the conduct of war.102 They, however, follow the trajectory discussed – that 
of achieving an elevation above one’s enemy, associated with geographical distancing and 
the moral/civilizational distance associated with governing through war from above.103 The 
present ambition, of both escalated weapon emancipation and human/machine merging, 
follows that same path. However autonomous, further distancing remains the goal.104 This 
is not a paradigm change.105 However, to the extent that there is a rapid acceleration of 
technological development we could, perhaps, refer to an ‘avalanche’: “when conditions 
are ripe, individual events, even small ones, can trigger a massive, downward rush.”106 This 
metaphor may serve to describe a well-established trajectory combined with the feeling that 
things may be spiralling out of control.  
From colonial asymmetry to the post-Cold War fighting of ‘terror’, the elevation above 
one’s enemy through weapons technology guarantees physical and moral distance; it also 
denotes, and imposes, the pretention of a higher civilisation. As we will see, the promise 
of precision, professionalisation, optimisation of decision making – with humans involved, 
but assisted by technology – underlines another kind of elevation: one that supposedly 
saves humans from themselves.  
 
3.2 Rising above oneself 
 
 
100 M. Gunneflo, Targeted Killing: A Legal and Political History (2016) 
101 A. Cockburn, Kill Chain: Drones and the Rise of High-Tech Assassins (2016). 
102 For their ‘mythical’ role in the production of a ‘new paradigm’ of law and war see I. Kalpouzos, ‘The Armed Drone’ 
in J. Hohmann and D. Joyce (eds.), International Law's Objects (2018). 
103 Munro, supra note 93; Gregory, supra note 93.   
104 DARPA’s TRACE program sets out the logic quite clearly, using language which connects Vietman’s electronic 
battlefield, through drone use, towards escalated automation, while highlighting the problematic effects of distance 
on the network’s reliability thus requiring the strengthening and further integration of a human/machine system: ‘In 
a target-dense environment, the adversary has the advantage of using sophisticated decoys and background traffic to 
degrade the effectiveness of existing automatic target recognition (ATR) solutions. Airborne strike operations against 
relocatable targets require that pilots fly close enough to obtain confirmatory visual identification before weapon 
release, putting the manned platform at extreme risk. Radar provides a means for imaging ground targets at safer and 
far greater standoff distances; but the false-alarm rate of both human and machine-based radar image recognition is 
unacceptably high. Existing ATR algorithms also require impractically large computing resources for airborne 
applications. Hence, current approaches for inserting ATR into tactical applications either move the processing to 
remote ground stations or drastically reduce performance to fit legacy airborne platform computing capabilities.’ 
https://www.darpa.mil/program/trace  
105 The, arguably overused, phrase, hails from T. Kuhn’s, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) where he argues 
that instead of viewing science as a rational cumulative process, it should be understood as entailing “intellectual 
revolutions” where “one conceptual world is replaced by another” (p. 10).  
106 L. Daston and P. Galison, Objectivity (2007), 49.  
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 ‘We are in an arms race with ourselves – and we are winning’.107  
Technological evolution in war is not only about overcoming the enemy. It is also about 
overcoming one’s own imperfections in the wielding of violence. It is a process of progress, 
improvement, rationalization, optimization, ultimately the civilization of war-fighting. The 
role of this second elevation, which both facilitates and aims to justify the elevation above 
one’s enemy, is often underappreciated. I will highlight it in this section, complementing 
the historical narrative above and recognising its influence on a certain view of the 
relationship between technology, war and international law.    
Elevation above oneself does not require asymmetrical relationships. The technological 
impetus of air power did not only serve the purpose of offense. It played a crucial role in 
the development of the relationship between human and machine for defensive purposes. 
The efforts to counter distancing and provide an effective defence against the German 
Luftwaffe and the early smart bomb technology of the V-1 and V-2 missiles significantly 
pushed forward artificial intelligence research.108 One such effort, led by Norbert Wiener, 
focused on the scientific articulation of human-machine interaction and the understanding 
of a pilot and his aircraft as a single unit, an integrated system, the behaviour of which 
could be predicted. While not successfully weaponised, the research led to Wiener’s theory 
of cybernetics,109 a widely influential theory for the scientific understanding of information, 
communication and the function of individuals in their socio-technical environment.   
Cybernetics is crucial for the evolution of human/machine merging, and the perception of 
self-improvement alongside the elevation above one’s adversary. Cybernetics is especially 
important for re-thinking law and agency in autonomous systems as it is, at the same time, 
based on a formalised understanding of information as the elementary unit for any sort of 
communication (human/human, human/machine, machine/human, or 
machine/machine) while having critical implications in relation to our understanding of 
agency and autonomy in human/machine systems. Therefore, it can be useful in 
appreciating that increasing autonomy and merged heteronomy are not opposites and that 
a ‘human-in-the-loop’ is not, by itself, the answer to the question of mechanisation of 
judgement.110 At the same time, the scientific understanding of human/machine systems 
as one entity in cybernetics allows the discussion of both the influence of artificial intelligence 
 
107 Jerome Wiesner, chairman of the Science Advisor Committee to President John F Kennedy, quoted in Graham 
Allison and Frederic A. Morris, 'Armaments and Arms Control. Exploring the Determinants of Military Weapons', in 
F. Long and G. Rathjens (eds). Arms, Defence Policy, and Arms Control, (1976) at 119. 
108 T. Rid, Rise of the Machines: The Lost History of Cybernetics (2017), chapter 1. 
109 N. Wiener, Cybernetics: or control and communication in the animal and the machine (2013, first published 1948) 
110 See also M. Arvidsson, ‘Targeting, Gender, and International Posthumanitarian Law and Practice: Framing the 
Question of the Human in International Humanitarian Law’ (2018) 44(1) Australian Feminist Law Journal 9. See also 
par. 22 of Annex III of the Report of the 2018 session of the Group of Governmental Experts on Emerging 
Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems where the ‘human’ is the only stable parameter in 
the discussion of meaningful human control over autonomous weapons.  
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on the application of substantive rules and issues of tracing agency and responsibility in 
complex human/machine structures.  
For cybernetics, as Peter Galison has pointed out, the enemy, the German Luftwaffe, with 
its smart missiles and able pilots, is already perceived as hyper-rational, an advanced unit 
of human/machines, ‘a mechanized Enemy Other’.111 The distance already achieved by the 
enemy is an impetus for understanding them, through Wiener’s research, as a merged 
human/machine system. This perception of the enemy and the effort to predict their 
behaviour extends to and corresponds to the cybernetic perception of the world, and 
ourselves, as merged human/machine systems. The understanding of the enemy’s 
humanity as partial, as merged with a technical system, is reflected back to the view of 
oneself and it is emulated. Their distance becomes our distance; their elevation is the 
impetus for ours. A formalised system of information sharing and a merging in 
technological structures is the way forward. This is what cybernetics endeavoured to 
provide.  
Such impetus for self-improvement through military technology was applied to the creation 
of broader systems for the governance of war. In the Cold War, alongside the offensive 
asymmetry of Vietnam’s aspired automated battlefield, the period saw the creation of 
sophisticated human/machine systems for defensive purposes as well. The massive 
investment in the Semi-Automatic Ground Environment (SAGE) system in the first 
decade of the Cold War – ‘the first large-scale, computerized command, control and 
communications system’ was aimed at ‘global oversight and instantaneous military 
response.’112 The identification of and response to the incoming threats would remain at a 
distance, achieved through the merging of human and machine surveillance power, in a 
complex and holistic system of artificial intelligence.  
In this mode of active defense, elevation above oneself and elevation above one’s enemy 
are seen as mutually reinforcing. The creation of distance and asymmetry in the elevation 
above one’s enemy envisions the conduct of war through an increasingly vertical 
relationship akin to governance.113 This entails qualities and aspirations associated with 
rational governance.114 Such qualities, like the rationalisation and optimisation of decision-
making, span the range of war-making, from the level of planning and prioritising targets 
(for example, on the production of ‘kill lists’115) to the level of the individual decision maker: 
 
111 P. Galison, ‘The Ontology of the Enemy: Norbert Wiener and the Cybernetic Vision’, (1994) 21(1) Critical Inquiry 
228. Galison points out, at 231, that, alongside cybernetics, this idea of a calculating enemy also motivated the 
development of game theory and operations research.  
112 Edwards, supra note 86, at 75. 
113 M Valverde and M Lomas, ‘Insecurity and Targeted Governance’ in W Larner and W Walters, Global Governmentality 
(2004) 233, at 245. 
114 M Weber, ‘The Vocation of Science’ in Sam Whimster (ed.), The Essential Weber: A Reader (2004), 270. 
115 See J. Weber, ‘Keep adding. On kill lists, drone warfare and the politics of databases’ 34(1) (2016) Society and Space 
107-125; for the construction of kill lists see G. McNeal, ‘Targeted Killing and Accountability’ 102 (2014) Georgetown 
Law Journal 681-794 and J. Scahill, The Assassination Complex: Inside The US Government’s Secret Drone Warfare Programme  
(2016).   
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the one pressing the button. The self-improvement through technology that puts one party 
in a position to govern through war is displayed in how that party governs through war, 
justifying its dominance.   
Elevation above oneself through technology is not, of course, limited to the conduct of 
war. Progress and self-improvement through technology is inscribed in a particular 
narrative of civilisation, evolution and progress. Historical investment in technology has at 
the same time aimed at the realisation of human potential and the transcendence of human 
limitations.116 In this sense, it is a metaphysic. It both celebrates humanity and aims to move 
beyond it.  
This tradition of thought will be engaged with, and related to law, in some more detail in 
the next section. Here, we will recognise its influence on the way technology is seen as 
serving the humanisation of war and law. The belief in the improvement of and on 
humanity can be observed on two levels: Firstly, technology is believed to be a progressive 
force due to its effects: in the bettering of the conditions of life (or the modalities of killing). 
Secondly, belief in the salutary and transcending effects of technology is associated and 
credited to a particular way of thinking,117 believed to have enabled technological progress 
in the first place. To the extent that technological progress produces thinking machines, 
this way of thinking is reified, hardwired, embodied in the technology itself – and fed back 
to human beings who interact with the machines they have created. The first level of belief 
in technology can be seen in the context of the discussion of the weapons’ effects. The 
second one is especially relevant to how machines and humans interact with law.  
Starting with the former, both distancing and the promise of precision118 associated with 
technology – from smart bombs, to drone surveillance/targeting, to algorithmic target 
selection – are often perceived as allowing for higher levels of discrimination in targeting. 
It may be that results on the ground challenge such promises,119 perhaps partly due to the 
license that users of advanced military technology felt able to take in setting out their input 
parameters.120 However, the promise remains, and the development of targeting technology 
is seen to contribute to the humanisation of war. New weapons, and imagined future 
weapons all the more, are seen as promising a level of precision heretofore unprecedented. 
 
116 As O’Connell, supra note 2, puts it, at 142: “If we want to be more than mere animals, we need to embrace 
technology’s potential to make us machines.” 
117 See P. Husbands et al, ‘Introduction: The Mechanical Mind’ in idem (eds.), The Mechanical Mind in History (2008). 
118 On the function of this promise in relation to the object of the drone, see Kalpouzos, supra note 106. 
119 See International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic (Stanford Law School) and Global Justice Clinic 
(NYU School of Law), Living Under Drones: Death, Injury, and Trauma to Civilians From Us Drone Practices in Pakistan 
(September 2012).  
120 On the practice of signature strikes see KJ Heller, ‘One Hell of a Killing Machine: Signature Strikes and 
International Law’ (2013) Journal of International Criminal Justice 89.  
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This feeling is shared, and expressed, both by governments121 and scholars.122 While current 
technological limitations, for example in terms of the limitations of face recognition 
technology, are often conceded, the general trajectory of humanisation through precision 
is repeatedly asserted. Indeed, such precision is identified at various levels, including the 
identification of kill lists,123 the taking of precautions,124 and the launching of attacks,125 to 
the extent that scholars even talk of a future obligation to use autonomous weapons 
systems.126 Technology allows certainty and predictability.127   
Moreover, as a matter of practice and individual decisions, increasing autonomy and 
merged heteronomy are seen to contribute to the elimination of mistakes, due to faulty and 
unreliable human judgement. Drone operators are physically removed from danger and the 
‘fog of war’ is filtered and weakened through the drone’s technological apparatus. And yet, 
 
121 Such statements have been especially made in the context of drones. See D Jackson, ‘Obama defends drone strikes,’ 
USA Today, January 31, 2012; John O. Brennan, (Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and 
Counterterrorism, US), ‘The efficacy and ethics of US counterterrorism strategy’, Woodrow Wilson Center, 
Washington DC, (30 April 2012) in Jameel Jaffer (ed.), The Drone Memos (2016) 199, 207: ‘it is hard to imagine a tool 
that can better minimize the risk to civilians”; Harold Hongju Koh (US State Department Legal Advisor), ‘The Obama 
Administration and International Law, Address at Annual  Meeting of the American  Society  of  International  Law’ 
(25 March 2010) in id., 119. This is also increasingly promised in the context of autonomous weapons. See Group of 
Governmental Experts of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use 
of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate 
Effects, Humanitarian benefits of emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapon systems Submitted 
by the United States of America 28 March 2018 CCW/GGE.1/2018/WP.4  available at 
https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/7C177AE5BC10B588C125825F004B06BE/$file/CCW
_GGE.1_2018_WP.4.pdf. Following the position that the law of war ‘is not meant to blunt the sword, but to sharpen 
it' the US DoD General Counsel argued that ‘human control’ as such is not, and should not be, an end in itself’ and 
that ‘[a]s a factual matter, the use of autonomy in weapon systems has improved the degree of control that human 
beings exercise over the use of force …[and]… can produce greater accuracy, precision, and speed in weapon systems.’ 
‘Remarks by Defense Department General Counsel Paul C. Ney Jr. on the Law of War’ Just Security (28 May 2019) at 
https://www.justsecurity.org/64313/remarks-by-defense-dept-general-counsel-paul-c-ney-jr-on-the-law-of-war/.   
122 M Schmitt, ‘Autonomous Weapons Systems and International Humanitarian Law: A Reply to Critics’, (2013) 4 
Harvard National Security Journal 1; K Anderson and M Waxman, ‘Debating Autonomous Weapon Systems, Their 
Ethics, and Their Regulation Under International Law’, in R Brownsword et al (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Law, 
Regulation and Technology (2017) 1097; Arkin, supra note 5; J. Beard, ‘The Principle of Proportionality in an Era of High 
Technology’ in C Ford and W Williams, Complex Battlespaces-  The Law of Armed Conflict and the Dynamics of Modern Warfare 
(2019) 
123 See for example the argument in P. Margulies that the superior pattern recognition capabilities of autonomous 
weapons will help in ‘mapping affinities that can ripen into terrorist affiliations’ and can therefore ‘be immensely 
helpful in identifying previous unknown followers of ISIS or other groups and implementing a targeting plan.’ See P 
Margulies, ‘Making autonomous weapons accountable: command responsibility for computer-guided lethal force in 
armed conflicts’ in Jens David Ohlin (ed.) Research Handbook on Remote Warfare (2017), 405, at 422-3. 
124 I.S. Henderson et al, ‘Remote and Autonomous Warfare Systems - Precautions in Attack and Individual 
Accountability’ in J. D. Ohlin (ed.), Research Handbook on Remote Warfare (2017), 335. 
125 See the contribution of Professor Mary Cummings in Annex III of Report of the 2018 session of the Group of 
Governmental Experts on Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, par. 26 
stating that ‘Due to the innate neuro-muscular lag of humans to perceive and act upon a situation…lethal autonomous 
weapons systems would be far more discriminatory provided existing  computer perception issues were sorted out. 
ON human-machine teaming…the ideal system in the battlefield would be the one that could strongly leverage the 
human-machine team.’  
126 See M. Sassoli, ‘Autonomous Weapons and International Humanitarian Law: Advantages, Open Technical 
Questions and Issues to be Clarified’ (2014) 91 International Law Studies 308, at 320 arguing that to the extent that 
autonomous weapons may be better at taking precautions commanders may have an obligation to use them.  
127 The US DoD AI Strategy, at p. 16, concurs: “We will seek opportunities to use AI to enhance our implementation 
of the Law of War. AI systems can provide commanders more tools to protect non-combatants via increased 
situational awareness and enhanced decision support.” 
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the drones’ promise of self-elevation above the frailty of human judgement and above the 
fog of war has proven illusory. Drone operators are still under pressure in making life and 
death decisions with limited knowledge and their humanity has allowed them to make 
mistakes, act recklessly and target with prejudice. Nor are they themselves sufficiently 
distanced from the enemy and elevated above the consequences of their action. Studies 
have shown that drone operators suffer significant post-traumatic stress.128 And yet the 
promise persists: further, or full, automation will leave such flaws behind.  
What is more, this trust in the self-elevating power of technology is inscribed in an overall 
perception of machines as more humane than humans,129 not prone to sadism and 
bloodthirstiness, to panic and anger. It has been said that ‘robots do not rape.’130 That 
‘[t]hey can be designed without emotions that cloud their judgment or result in anger or 
frustration with ongoing battlefield events.’131 That they are free from the ‘fear and hysteria’ 
that push humans towards ‘fearful measures and criminal behaviour.’132  
Technology, and automation, may therefore elevate us above our inhumane humanity. 
Technology will thus limit the circumstances under which we need to revert to our faulty 
judgement, especially under pressure. Human judgement, in the conduct of war, is 
perceived as weak and unreliable. Distance from it is seen as improving, even salutary. We 
delegate judgement to machines and the de-humanization of war entails its civilisation.  
When President Kennedy’s scientific advisor referred to the victory in the ‘arms race 
against ourselves’, in the quote opening this section, he was not making a philosophical 
point. He was, rather, referring to the US overcoming difficulties developing the weapons 
technology that would allow it to win the Cold War. And yet, the arms race against 
ourselves can be understood to reflect a more fundamental struggle: against human 
weakness, in body and mind; against the imperfection of our humanity. Technology and 
war, technology in war, are the battlefronts and law plays its part.  
 
128 "Of the 1084 United States Air Force (USAF) drone operators that participated, a total of 4.3% endorsed a pattern 
of symptoms of moderate to extreme level of severity meeting criteria outlined in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorders-4th edition. The incidence of PTSD among USAF drone operators in this study was lower than 
rates of PTSD (10–18%) among military personnel returning from deployment but higher than incidence rates (less 
than 1%) of USAF drone operators reported in electronic medical records." See W. Chappelle et al, ‘An analysis of 
post-traumatic stress symptoms in United States Air Force drone operators’ (2014) 28(5) Journal of Anxiety Disorders 
480. http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0887618514000656; Chamayou, supra note 95, at 117-9. 
129 Arkin, supra note 5, at xvi. See also Chamayou, supra note 95, at 208-9 on the distinction between ontological and 
axiological humanity.  
130 See this position in the otherwise critical report of Special Rapporteur Heyns par. 54: ‘[Lethal Autonomous Robots] 
will not be susceptible to some of the human shortcomings that may undermine the protection of life. Typically they 
would not act out of revenge, panic, anger, spite, prejudice or fear. Moreover, unless specifically programmed to do 
so, robots would not cause intentional suffering on civilian populations, for example through torture. Robots also do 
not rape.’ See K Bergtora Sandvik and K Lohne, ‘Lethal Autonomous Weapons: Killing the ‘Robots-don’t-Rape’ 
Arguments, IntLawGrrls Blog, 5 August 2015, available at https://ilg2.org/2015/08/05/lethal-autonomous-weapons-
killing-the-robots-dont-rape-argument/; See also J. Turner, We should regulate, not ban killer robots, 28 August 2017, 
The Spectator, available at https://blogs.spectator.co.uk/2017/08/we-should-regulate-not-ban-killer-robots/ 
131 Arkin, supra note 5, at 29.  
132 Ibid with reference to M Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars.  
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3.3 The inherent compatibility of legal technics  
  
Elevation above oneself relies on mechanical rationality. The distance it creates from the 
frailty of human judgement stands on the shoulders of an increasingly hardwired way of 
thinking. Thinking as calculation, and the perception of the human mind as a machine, 
have a long tradition in the trajectory of rationalist philosophy. From Hobbes133 through 
Leibniz134 to Descartes135 the metaphor of mind as machine inspired both a rich philosophy 
of science and an intense urge for scientism.136 Descartes’ ambitious parallels between 
machines and non-human animals and his speculation on the creation of indistinguishable 
automata place him at the centre of this tradition, even though his clear separation of mind 
from body allowed his cognitive philosophy to remain free of his materialism. To the 
extent, however, that the mind and cognition are identified with the brain, Cartesianism 
may ‘degenerate’ into machinist disembodied cognition.137 Alongside the submission of the 
mind, through the brain, to mechanical description, a strand of logical positivism centres 
on the symbolic representation of the world. For example, in the 20th century, Gottlieb 
Frege ‘showed that rules could be formalized so that they could be manipulated without 
intuition or interpretation.’138   
Elizabeth Boden has documented in detail how this tradition of ‘mind as machine’ and 
formal logic are central in the development of both the ambitions and the philosophy of 
cognitive science and artificial intelligence.139 The rich history of this relationship and the 
intricacies of the philosophical debate are beyond the scope of our inquiry. And yet that 
understanding of mind as machine and of thinking as, however complicated, symbolic 
representation can be found in certain strands of legal thinking, influencing the role of legal 
scholarship and practice on technology in war. Indeed, the process of and the quest for the 
establishment of principles, precedents, predictable outcomes and the overall 
 
133 See S Franchi and G Güzeldere, Machinations of the Mind: Cybernetics and Artificial Intelligence from Automata 
to Cyborgs’ in idem (eds), Mechanical Bodies, Computational Minds: Artificial Intelligence from Automata to Cyborgs (2005), 15, 
40-41. 
134 See P. Beeley, ‘Leibniz and Hobbes’ in B. Look (ed.), The Bloomsbury Companion to Leibniz (Bloomsbury, 2014) 32-
51. See also the influence of Leibniz on Charles Babbage and the creation of his Analytical Engine, the first generally 
programmable machine in S. Bullock, ‘Charles Babbage and the Emergence of Automated Reason’ in P. Husbands et 
al, The Mechanical Mind in History (2008), 19-40. 
135 While Descartes was not, as a whole, a materialist and believed that reason was beyond the reach of mere machines 
his role in mechanistic thinking is explored in M. Wheeler, ‘God’s Machines: Descartes and the Mechanization of 
Mind’ in P. Husbands et al, The Mechanical Mind in History (2008), 307. 
136 See R. Williams, ‘Introduction’ in R. Williams and D. Robinson (eds.), Scientism: The New Orthodoxy (2015); M. 
Boudry and M. Pigliucci (eds.), Science Unlimited? The Challenges of Scientism (2017). 
137 This is also at the centre of Noll’s discussion of neurotechnology and the separation between cognition and 
perception. See at 219-223 with some reference to the literature critiquing ‘degenerate Cartesianism’ in the philosophy 
of neuroscience.  
138 Hubert Dreyfus, What Computers Still Can’t Do: A Critique of Artificial Reason (1992), xi 
139 E. Boden, Mind as Machine: A History of Cognitive Science volume I & II (2006).  
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professionalization and formalisation of judgement (in war fighting) has been central to the 
contemporary law of armed conflict project.  
There are important parallels between the aspirations and hopes assigned to technology 
and those assigned to law. Chief technological optimists today, indeed, suggest that 
automation will simply play the role of making sure the law is enforced,140 to the extent that 
‘bad apples’ and the ‘fog of war’ do not interfere. This attitude is especially strong in non-
lawyers, perhaps prone to simplistic versions of the law,141 but it also finds fertile ground 
in different strands of mainstream legal analysis.  
The dominant discourse approaches the present and future regulation of autonomous 
weapons as a question of compatibility. What is asserted is a set of rules and what is 
required is for a machine – both the machine’s hardware and its software – to be able to 
meet and implement these rules. The question becomes, for example, whether the principle 
of distinction or the avowedly more complex principle of proportionality142 can be 
articulated in a series of logical steps and whether the machine’s technological capacity, for 
example in image recognition of the received characteristics of a civilian target, is able to 
perform such a code. Such logical steps can be set out as a mathematical formula143 or as 
programming language.144 Myriad questions can be posed about the specifics of such 
categorisation, but I am concerned with the overall stance. And this is one of wait-and-see. 
The position could be simplistically stated thus: ‘Currently we do not have the technology 
that would perform a distinction or proportionality calculation. While we don’t have 
answers to all of the challenges, maybe we will in the future. In which case, the autonomous 
system will go through a weapons review and this will determine its compatibility with the 
law of armed conflict.’ 145 
One constituency taking such an approach are ‘pragmatist’ (military) lawyers, who, while 
of course cognisant of legal complexities, especially those associated with notoriously 
difficult to apply principles such as proportionality, are open to the logic of the law’s 
codification in algorithms. Such a task of codification is essentially seen as a question for 
 
140 E.g. Arkin, supra note 5. 
141 Conversely, idealized versions of the law often feed blanket opposition to autonomous weapons systems, as will 
be discussed further below.  
142 M. Wagner, ‘The Dehumanization of International Humanitarian Law: Legal, Ethical and Political Implications of 
Autonomous Weapons Systems’ (2014) 47 Vanderbilt Journal of International Law 1371, at 1393.  
143 For a recent attempt at articulating the basic principles of distinction, proportionality and precautions as a set of 
mathematical formulae see M Schmitt and Major M Schauss, ‘Uncertainty in the Law of Targeting: Towards a 
Cognitive Framework’ (2019) Harvard National Security Journal 148. It should be noted the authors are, however, careful 
to point out, at 152, that “[t]he formulae should not be viewed as an attempt to reduce targeting decisions to 
mechanical deterministic calculations” and that their formulations aim to inform the choices of operators, rather than 
to be imposed through an algorithm. 
144 See Arkin, supra note 5, and, for example, his programming algorithm for the principle of proportionality at p. 186. 
145 The expert contribution of William Boothby at the 2015 CCW Meeting of Experts is typical: “We do not know 
whether future technology may produce weapon systems that can out-perform humans in protecting civilians and 
civilian objects. It would in my view be a mistake to try to ban a technology on the basis of its current shortcomings, 
when in future it may actually enable the law to be complied with more reliably than now.” 
https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/616D2401231649FDC1257E290047354D/$file/2015_L
AWS_MX_BoothbyS+Corr.pdf 
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engineering. When the technology will allow it, there is no reason why codification may 
not occur.146 Therefore, even if one does not rush to diagnose legal salvation through 
technology yet, one does not see why law and automated decision making wouldn’t be 
compatible.  
Indeed, jurisprudential approaches especially associated with a strand of philosophy of 
logic,147 arguably go further, seeing law and technology as inherently compatible and 
artificial intelligence as an ideal avenue to discuss questions of legal logic and the 
categorisation, interpretation and application of rules.148 Law itself is seen as potentially 
profiting from the tools of formal logic associated with AI, the two constituting a mutually 
improving and reinforcing relationship of formalisation.149 There are two things needed: 
‘contents to be inserted in the knowledge base, and the choice of formalism (with related 
formal inferential procedure) in which to represent those contents.’150 Judgement is, again, 
reserved on the extent to which technology is currently able to provide the tools for legal 
interpretation and application – for example in matters of visual recognition, natural 
language processing, adaptability. And the especial difficulties posed by contextual and 
qualitative judgements in the application of certain legal rules is recognised.151 The position 
about the future is agnostic; or, it is in abeyance. The answer remains to be seen, complex 
problems of engineering, beyond current science, will need to be resolved. Of course, ‘the 
perfectibility of man is absolutely indefinite’.152 And law is treated as inherently 
technological; law is a technology – our self-perfection and civilisation will occur through 
law and technology in tandem.  
This is not to discount the potential rigour of analytical logic, the usefulness of some 
computational tools153 or the use of pragmatist professionalism when encountering issues 
in the law’s application, including in the context of new weapons technology. It is, however, 
 
146 See R. Williams, ‘Introduction’ in R. Williams and D. Robinson, Scientism: The New Orthodoxy (2015): ‘Technology 
is the ultimate pragmatism, and in a world dominated by technology, and intoxicated by technological solutions to 
practical problems, everything is viewed as ‘standing in reserve,’ ready to be used by or subjected to some sort of 
technology or technological process.’ 
147 See generally the work of Giovanni Sartor and the editors and contributors in the Journal Artificial Intelligence and 
Law.  
148 See G Sartor, ‘Artificial Intelligence in Law and Legal Theory’ (1992) 10 Current Legal Theory, 1.   
149 Ibid, at 2: ‘it is true that the analyses of legal theory have rarely attained the level of specificity and precision required 
by computability, especially because the use of formal methods in law has been limited to a few exceptions. 
Nevertheless, even informal analyses can be of enormous importance for AI, which is exposed to simplifications and 
reductionisms also because of its need for formalization.’ 
150 Ibid, at 23. 
151 Ibid, at 36.  
152 Condorcet, Sketch for a Historical Picture of the Progress of the Human Mind (1795). The phrase was recently cited, with 
the observation that Condorcet committed suicide in prison during the Terror soon after writing it, in Dav id Bell’s 
rather critical review of Stephen Pinker’s ‘oversimplified’ understanding of the Enlightenment and his “starkly 
technocratic prescription for the human future”. See D. Bell, ‘The PowerPoint Philosophe: Waiting for the 
Enlightenment of Stephen Pinker” The Nation, 7 March 2018, at https://www.thenation.com/article/waiting-for-
steven-pinkers-enlightenment/ 
153 See W. Alschner, ‘The Computational Analysis of International Law’ in R Deplano and N Tsagourias (eds) Ressearch 
Methods in International Law: A Handbook (2019) for the developing techniques in the ‘mining’ of ‘international law as 
data’.  
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to suggest that both stances may display a tendency to uncritically embrace a reductive 
approach to law, through technology, one that will not do justice to its substance, one that 
pursues the dehumanization of judgement in the service of double elevation. Law as 
technology, as formal logic to be engineered in artificially intelligent machines, can be seen 
as rising above the frailty of human judgement.   
 
4. Against Double Elevation 
 
4.1 Angst  
 
The trajectory of optimism has always gone hand in hand with angst. Indeed, at the very 
start of post-war futuristic engagement optimism and pessimism co-existed. While Norbert 
Wiener preached the coexistence and self-regulating adaptation of human/machine in his 
book Cybernetics, his intellectual integrity allowed him to repeatedly deplore the social, 
political and moral dangers of automation, both in a companion volume written for the 
general public154 and in his interactions with increasingly starry-eyed disciples.155  
The prosecution of war heightens such angst. Increasingly, the perils of double elevation 
are recognised. The trajectory of the debates over the use of “smart bombs” in Kosovo156 
or Iraq to the drone-enabled ‘War on Terror’ evoke the distancing that elevation above the 
enemy may produce over the often de-humanized other and the production of indefinite 
asymmetrical global war. Similarly, elevation above oneself has been perceived to lead to 
‘the fabrication of political automata’157 and the loss of freedom. The latter point is 
meaningfully set out in the context of armed drones by Roger Berkowitz, director of the 
Hannah Arendt Centre: 
 ‘In the end, the threat drones pose is not only to civilians in war or to jobs. The 
real threat is that as our lives are increasingly habituated to the thoughtless 
automatism of drone behavior, we humans habituate ourselves to acting in 
mechanical, algorithmic, and logical ways. The danger drones pose, in other words, 
is the loss of freedom.’158  
 
154 See N. Wiener, The Human Use of Human Beings: Cybernetics and Society (1950) and idem, ‘Some moral and technical 
consequences of automation’ (1960) 131(3410) Science 1355. This is developed in more philosophical depth in his God 
& Golem, Inc.: A Comment on Certain Points where Cybernetics Impinges on Religion (1964).  
155 One of these was Alice Mary Hilton whose Logic, Computing Machines and Automation (1963) placed its hopes on 
automation for “human beings [to] become truly civilised.” See Wiener’s letter of 8 March 1963 in Rid, supra note 113, 
at 103.  
156 For a conceptual analysis at the time see P Kahn, ‘The Paradox of Riskless Warfare’, (2002) Philosophy & Public 
Policy Quarterly 2. 
157 Chamayou, supra note 95, at 205 et seq.  
158 R Berkowitz, ‘Drones and the Question of the “Human”’ (2014) 28(2) Ethics & International Affairs 159, at 169.  
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Beyond double elevation, this angst over the loss of judgement, over the loss of control 
over the moral parameters of war-fighting and decision-making feed into the wider 
existential fear associated with technological pessimism, namely that the emancipation of 
the creation will be complete, lost to its creator. This concern, at the level of prediction, 
fears that we are nearing a ‘singularity’ where artificial intelligence will fully escape human 
control. While some have hailed this coming singularity in near-religious terms,159 and 
some, associated with the transhumanist movement, invest in what they perceive as our 
overcoming our essential human weakness and even overcoming death,160 others are 
pausing in existential dread.161 While it is important to separate the angst associated with 
the loss of control over specific tasks from that over a wider ‘sorcerer’s apprentice’ deluge, 
such fears are as interrelated as the aspirations that feed them.  
What is to be done? How do those not sharing in the enthusiasm of scientism or an 
agnosticism of piece-meal problem solving engage in the present formation of the future 
of war, technology and law?   
The major stance in opposition to technological escalation towards full autonomy is 
centering on the taboo of delegating life/death decisions to machines and the innate 
inability of machines to properly apply law. A public expression of this position is that of 
the Campaign to Ban Killer Robots.162 The campaign is notable in resisting both superficial 
techno-optimism and dangerously instrumental pragmatism. The potential power of 
mobilisation of public opposition notwithstanding, the position presents some analytical, 
strategic and conceptual shortcomings.  
Firstly, the Campaign’s approach starts from an assumption of a fundamental ‘change of 
paradigm’.163 This doesn’t always appreciate the continuing role of technology in war and 
its function in the double elevation described here. Indeed, I have argued that the escalation 
towards full autonomy and merged heteronomy represents a continuation of an existing 
trajectory of distancing through the elevation above one’s enemy and above oneself, albeit 
with a perhaps justified presentiment of an ‘avalanche’, a violent acceleration of pace, out 
of control.  
Secondly, present practice does not suggest that a prospect of successful imposition of a 
ban or moratorium is realistic. This is due both to the anticipated military advantage and 
 
159 Kurzweil, supra note 2. 
160 See O’Connell, supra note 2 for interviews with current adherents of the faith.  
161 For example, Bostrom, supra note 4. Importantly Bostrom was a member of the transhumanist movement; his 
book has been recently recommended by such techno-optimists as Elon Musk and Bill Gates; his Oxford Project is 
funded, partly, by the former.  
162 See https://www.stopkillerrobots.org; See also Human Rights Watch, ‘Making the Case: The Dangers of Killer 
Robots and the Need for a Preemptive Ban’ 9 December 2016 available at 
https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/12/09/making-case/dangers-killer-robots-and-need-preemptive-ban  
163 J. Kellenberger, ‘International humanitarian law and new weapon technologies’, Thirty-Fourth Round Table on 
Current Issues of International Law, 8-10 September 2011, available at 
https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/F77AF42ED509F890C1257CD90025183F/$file/IHL+
&+new+weapon+technologies_Sanremo.pdf 
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the inscription of this process in socioeconomic structures and expectations, as reflected 
in the evidence of enthusiastic investment in the acceleration of this trajectory. Instead, as 
the analysis above has suggested, while the absolute of full autonomy (combining kinetic 
and cognitive elements) is kept at bay, the ground is constantly prepared.   
Thirdly, the primary focus on preventing full autonomy or, inevitably anthropomorphised, 
‘killer robots’ is in danger of missing the target. Autonomy is complemented by increasingly 
merged heteronomy. As discussed in section 2.1 above, merged heteronomy addresses the 
logistical limitations of spatially spread human/machine networks. Crucially, while 
presenting itself as respecting the moral taboo of life-and-death delegation, merged 
heteronomy advances the mechanisation of judgement in pursuit of double elevation. To 
the extent that the maintenance of ‘meaningful human control’ is primarily focused on 
‘keeping humans in the loop’, it is in danger of ignoring the gradual change in the nature 
and function of that very loop. As reliance on AI increases, it is humans who are becoming 
the ‘killer robots’.  
Finally, to the extent that the position relies on the incompatibility of autonomous weapons 
with international humanitarian law, it may be vulnerable to the complicity, discussed in 
section 3.3, of certain strands of legal thinking with an understanding of knowledge as ‘a 
large store of neutral data’164 and the promise of the piece-meal resolution of technical legal 
problems. It also allows one’s intuitive angst to be assuaged by promises of, or indeed steps 
towards, the panacea of global regulation.165 As important as such regulation may be in 
structuring the ambitions of both state and private actors, it would not, per se, address the 
most fundamental dangers of the mechanisation of judgement.  
Law will neither ban nor regulate away what causes our angst. To the contrary, it may be 
adapted to serve mechanised judgement. If we are to oppose double elevation and the 
mechanisation of judgement, and hope to use law to this effect, we need legal thinking to 
serve this purpose. Otherwise, all we can do is surrender to the stance of agnostic abeyance, 
until the code is engineered. 
 
4.2 Irreducible intelligence, and irreducible law 
 
An opposition to the present future of the loss of judgement requires an understanding of 
law as irreducible. I have argued that the evolution of new weapons technology towards 
increasing autonomy and merged heteronomy serves, and accelerates, a double elevation, 
above one’s enemy and above oneself, which pursues the mechanization and distancing of 
judgement; that to the extent that the role of law, in this context, is viewed as a question 
 
164 H. Dreyfus, What Computers Can’t Do (1972), at 190.  
165 Indeed, the recently released first US DoD AI Strategy Summary gestures, at p. 15, towards ‘a global set of military 
AI guidelines’. 
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of ‘compatibility’ or ‘adaptability’, there is a danger that it, too, would serve this purpose. 
And yet, while law is no panacea to be administered through regulation or outright 
proscription, it does not have to be the handmaiden of mechanization. In this section, I 
conclude by arguing that to think of the law of war in a way that resists the demands of 
double elevation, we should turn to the philosophical and sociological critique of the 
cognitive science that buttresses much of the existing logic of artificial intelligence. 
Alongside our understanding of the historical and material process whereby double 
elevation and increasing autonomy are produced, outlined above, the critiques of the 
epistemology of artificial intelligence are a necessary guide for the appreciation, defence, 
and practice of irreducible legal thought.     
Gregor Noll, in his analysis of the influence that the weaponisation of neurotechnology 
has on IHL, uses the critiques of positivist cognitive science and its reliance on antiquated 
or simplistic understandings of cognition ‘reducing high-level behaviours to low-level, 
mechanical explanations, formalising them through pure scientific rationality’.166  He 
highlights what he calls the ‘degenerate cartesianism’167 of neuroscience, which is expressed 
in the separation between perception and cognition. Isolating cognition, including legal 
cognition, from human perception, he argues, reduces ‘the legal knowledge of the IHL 
experts […] to a set of skills regarding a particular procedure to be followed in decision-
making and a range of outcomes’.168  
To understand this process of reduction, the intellectual history of artificial intelligence and 
the fierce debates around its epistemological qualities are instructive.169 A ‘representationist’ 
theory of mind, understanding thought as the computation of symbols representing 
reality,170 trusted and employed, with varying sophistication, by generations of artificial 
intelligence research, has been consistently criticised since the beginnings of ‘good old-
fashioned AI (GOFAI)’171 by Hubert Dreyfus. A philosopher infiltrating the MIT AI 
community, Dreyfus’ 1965 RAND Corporation memorandum172 and his 1972 book173 
constituted a full-frontal attack on an emerging and ambitious project. Dreyfus argued that 
representational thinking fails to account for the ‘know-how, [which,] along with all the 
interests, feelings, motivations, and bodily capacities that go to make a human being, would 
have had to be conveyed to the computer as knowledge. […M]aking our inarticulate, 
 
166 P. Dourish, Where the Action Is: The Foundations of Embodied Interaction (2004), at vii. 
167 See Noll, supra note 17, at 220-3.  
168 Ibid 223 
169 These were no bloodless academic affair. The personal nature of the debate may be related to the personalities of 
the participants or their professional investments, but arguably also reflects fundamental differences in respective 
epistemologies. The personal nature is reflected, for example, in the introductions to the different editions of Hubert 
Dreyfus’ What Computers (Still) Can’t Do, the reviews of the book’s re-issue in the special issue of volume 80 (1996) 
of Artificial Intelligence, and Boden supra 143 chapter 11.  
170 For a discussion of different, ‘strong and weak’, representationist theories see F. Egan, ‘Representationism’ in E. 
Margolis et al, The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Cognitive Science (2012), 250. 
171 The term denotes the first phase of artificial intelligence, from the 1950s to the 1990s, also referred to as ‘symbolic 
AI’. It was coined by J. Haugeland in Artificial Intelligence: The Very Idea (1985).  
172 H. Dreyfus, Alchemy and Artificial Intelligence (1965) available at https://www.rand.org/pubs/papers/P3244.html 
173 H. Dreyfus, What Computers Can’t Do (1972) 
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preconceptual background understanding of what it is like to be a human being explicit in 
a symbolic representation [is] a hopeless task.’174  
Symbolic representation, Dreyfus insisted, can only take you so far. According to this view, 
the AI projects, from the 50s to the 90s, attempting to input a map of reality in a machine, 
sometimes through the use of distinct ‘micro-worlds’ which would be used for 
generalisations, were pointless and doomed to fail.175 Outside the battles of academia, the 
futility of perfect representation is, perhaps, best conveyed in a story by Jorge Luis Borges, 
entitled On Exactitude in Science, so short it may be cited in its entirety:  
 
...In that Empire, the Art of Cartography attained such Perfection that the map of 
a single Province occupied the entirety of a City, and the map of the Empire, the 
entirety of a Province. In time, those Unconscionable Maps no longer satisfied, and 
the Cartographers Guilds struck a Map of the Empire whose size was that of the 
Empire, and which coincided point for point with it. The following Generations, 
who were not so fond of the Study of Cartography as their Forebears had been, saw 
that that vast Map was Useless, and not without some Pitilessness was it, that they 
delivered it up to the Inclemencies of Sun and Winters. In the Deserts of the West, 
still today, there are Tattered Ruins of that Map, inhabited by Animals and Beggars; 
in all the Land there is no other Relic of the Disciplines of Geography.176  
  
A perfect code is impossible, futile and self-defeating. It is not only that we may not be 
able to agree on and articulate the primary rules to be input in the system,177 it is that once 
they are abstracted from their human masters they become ‘counterfeit’. This applies to 
law as much as it applies to the rules of cognition in general.178  
Machine learning neural networks do not overcome this problem. While these, unlike 
symbolic AI, don’t simply reproduce a symbolic representation map, but develop ‘a history 
of input-output pairs’,179 their learning and adaptive behaviour is second-order, as it follows 
pre-set parameters. While quantitively sophisticated, they mimic rather than think.180 Even 
if mapping and generalisation are adaptive and self-generating, the counterfeit problem 
 
174 H. Dreyfus, What Computers Still Can’t Do (1992), at xvi-xvii. 
175 Ibid, at 4-27. 
176 in The Aleph and Other Stories (Penguin, 2000, translated by Andrew Hurley), at 181. 
177 See for example Haque’s point that the disagreements on proportionality ‘are substantive, not semantic, and rooted 
in its contestability, not its vagueness’. In A. Haque, ‘Indeterminacy and the Law of Armed Conflict’ (2019) 95 
International Law Studies, p. 15. 
178 One of the first cognitive scientists to appreciate Dreyfus’ critique recognises that phenomenologists ‘point out 
that in such an approach we are no longer using the theoretical terms in their original authentic sense: We have 
abandoned the original problem and find ourselves talking about a counterfeit world in place of the one we initially 
intended to study – a formal world of logic, mathematics and ‘bits’ of information in place of a human world of 
experience, knowledge and purpose.’ See Z. Pylyshyn, ‘Minds, machines and phenomenology: Some reflections on 
Dreyfus’ ‘What computers can’t do’’ (1974) 3(1) Cognition, 57, 63. 
179 Dreyfus, supra note 175, at xv.  
180 See also Berkowitz, supra note 161, at 165, on the question of drone-generated art.  
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remains. ‘Deep learning’ is as vulnerable to the critique as symbolic representation was. It 
is not only that AI has, so far, failed beyond the reproduction of mechanic tasks. It is that 
it can never succeed. In his final piece of writing, more than forty years after his first 
missive, Dreyfus argues that, because “how we directly pick up significance and improve 
our sensitivity to relevance depends on our responding to what is significant for us” given 
our particular characteristics, for a non-representational AI to be successful 
 
we would not only need a model of the brain functioning underlying coupled coping 
[…], but we would also need—and here’s the rub—a model of our particular way 
of being embedded and embodied such that what we experience is significant for 
us in the particular way that it is. That is, we would have to include in our program 
a model of a body very much like ours with our needs, desires, pleasures, pains, 
ways of moving, cultural background, etc.181 
 
Our distinct cognitive functions cannot be abstracted from our overall existence. 
Importantly, while expressed in the language of functionality and prediction, Dreyfus’ 
discussion of ‘what computers can’t do’ entails what they shouldn’t (try to) do. Using the 
emotive language of ‘obscenity’ and ‘disgust’, Joseph Weizenbaum’s182 epistemology is 
more avowedly existentialist: ‘an organism is defined, in large part, by the problems it faces. 
Man faces problems no machine could possibly be made to face. Man is not a machine.’183 
Indeed, to the question posed to him by the eminent AI researcher John McCarthy ‘‘What 
do judges know that we cannot tell a computer?’’184 Weizenbaum responded violently: ‘The 
very asking of the question […] is a monstrous obscenity. That it has to be put into print 
at all, even for the purpose of exposing its morbidity, is a sign of the madness of our 
times.’185 
If Dreyfus and Weizenbaum decry the futility and impoverishment of cognitive reduction, 
the sociology of science highlights the consequences in human/machine systems. One of 
the reviewers of the 1992 re-issue of Dreyfus’ book, Harry Collins, argued that Dreyfus did 
not go far enough in appreciating the social embeddedness of both computers and humans 
 
181 H. Dreyfus, ‘Why Heideggerian AI failed and why fixing it would require making it more Heideggerian (2007)’ in 
H. Dreyfus and M. Wrathall, Skillful Coping: Essays on the phenomenology of everyday perception and action (2014) 250, 272-3. 
This phrasing is critiquing what Dreyfus considered the artificial intelligence model most removed from 
representational thinking, Walter Freeman’s theory of cognitive science model which “instantiates a genuine 
intentional arc according to which there are no linear causal connections nor a fixed library of data, but where, each 
time a new significance is encountered, the whole perceptual world of the animal changes so that significance as 
directly displayed is contextual, global, and continually enriched.” Ibid at 267. 
182 See especially J. Weizenbaum, Computer Power and Human Reason: From Judgment to Calculation (1976). 
183 Ibid, 203. 
184 McCarthy’s answer was ‘nothing’, as he thought ‘all human knowledge could be formally represented by AI’. See 
E Boden, Mind as Machine: A History of Cognitive Science volume I & II (2006) at 851. For the work of John McCarthy, the 
‘father of AI’, according to his own website, see http://jmc.stanford.edu/. McCarthy was also one of the least patient 
reviewers of Dreyfus’ work. See J. McCarthy, ‘Review of Hubert Dreyfus, What Computers Still Can’t Do’ (1996) 80 
Artificial Intelligence 143. 
185 Weizenbaum supra note 189, 226-7. 
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as well as, crucially, the concepts that humans are using.186 There was no independently 
stable knowledge to be input in the computer in the first place.187This unstable knowledge, 
reduced through programming, is then fed back to humans with the veneer of disembodied 
objectivity. Twenty-two years later, it is the poverty rather than the dreaded omniscience 
of artificial intelligence which is the major threat:  
As it is, the big danger facing us is not the Singularity; it is failing to notice 
computers’ deficiencies when it comes to appreciating social context and treating 
all consequent mistakes as our fault. Thus, much worse, and much more pressing 
than the danger of being enslaved by enormously intelligent computers, is our 
allowing ourselves to become the slaves of stupid computers – computers that we 
take to have resolved the difficult problems but that, in reality, haven’t resolved 
them at all: the danger is not the Singularity but the Surrender!188 
The critiques of the epistemology and sociology of artificial intelligence must inform our 
understanding of its relationship with law. They can help us understand what is lost and 
impoverished when legal concepts and rules are reduced to algorithm – the futility, but also 
the harm in the pretension of perfect representation and reproduction. They can also help 
us understand the process of both intellectual and moral impoverishment in the removal 
of intelligence from its social context and the outsourcing, through formalisation, of life-
and-death decisions to mechanised judgement. The ‘surrender’ Harry Collins refers to 
above, can be understood in the context of law as an abdication of responsibility. I am not 
referring here, stricto sensu, to the stretching of individual liability to the breaking point in 
complex human/machine systems, but to the responsibility inherent in our interactions 
with the law. Legal rules and principles, such as that of proportionality, reflect a 
combination of values that are both meaningful and problematic. It is our task, through 
our situated moral intelligence, flawed as it is, to take responsibility for the rules governing 
our violence and to act as custodians, interpreters, and appliers of the law. All the more so 
when these rules and principles are applied by human beings who risk their lives for the 
collective against the lives of other human beings, in other collectives.  
If there is a task for law in countering double elevation, it is not discharged through 
regulation, but it requires the defence of its complexity, its subtlety and its humanity in a 
way that resists a mechanistic philosophy of cognition. Legal thinking should not avoid the 
uncertainty and incommensurability of situated judgement, but embrace it. This is 
judgement that is situated in human relationships within collective structures; judgement 
 
186 See H. Collins, ‘Embedded or embodied? a review of Hubert Dreyfus’ What Computers Still Can’t Do’ 80 (1996) 
Artificial Intelligence 99, 101-105 referring to late Wittgenstein. 
187 Interestingly, Collins identifies an exception of what he calls ‘mimeographic actions’ ‘areas of human life where 
behavior can be substituted for action, where humans could be trained to accomplish satisfactory outcomes in the way 
that pigeons are trained, and where machines that exhibit the appropriate behavior can stand in for human 
counterparts. In human life there are no domains that are wholly like this, but many where we strive to make them 
thus. Initial military training is perhaps the best developed large-scale version but the phenomenon is found on a small 
scale within many domains’ Ibid at 110. 
188 H. Collins, Artifictional Intelligence (2018), 5. 
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in the immediacy of decision-making in battle, which cannot be conclusively determined a 
priori; judgement when real human beings are making impossible choices.  
The quest for the exercise of irreducible intelligence in law does not entail a distinct 
jurisprudential preference. While the appreciation of the complexity and indeterminacy of 
legal meaning and the decisive role of social context in both the making and application of 
the law may be associated with the anti-formalism of pragmatism, critical legal studies or 
the Third World Approaches to International Law, this is not the goal of this article. 
Despite the fact that certain strands of formalist or mainstream lawyering seem to be 
comfortable with their reducibility to algorithmic input, legal thinking and judgement ought 
to display a situated intelligence irrespective of their jurisprudential politics. Indeed, the law 
of war will be applied in battle, by soldiers who are unlikely to have subscribed to a 
particular school of jurisprudence.  
Doctrinal scholarship is perfectly capable of irreducible subtlety. Indeed, the challenge that 
automation poses to positivist scholarship is not the formulation of rules in a way that can 
be coded, but the contribution to the clarity of the law in a way that cannot be automatically 
reproduced. But it may also be that the international law of war, in order to address the 
increasing pressures of double elevation, should step back to question, historicize and 
theorize189 its fundamental concepts and their application. The scholars and practitioners 
of the law of war should study the evolving sociotechnical landscape, and our gradual 
immersion in human/machine systems.190 They should take on the epistemological 
challenge of engaging the elements of its situated subjectivity – the discretion,191 emotion,192  
imagination,193 passion194 in the rules and their application.  
Conclusion 
 
The value of the law is precisely in what cannot be grasped in computational form and our 
legal thinking should reflect this. The present future of the mechanisation of judgement 
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shouldn’t be seen as a radical break with the past, an alien invasion. It is, rather, the 
accelerated evolution of an impoverished tradition. Both increasing automation and 
merged heteronomy are advancing the distancing and mechanization of judgement in the 
service of double elevation – against our enemies and against our very selves. While we 
fear losing our place ‘in the loop’, that very loop is changing and, potentially with the 
complicity of legal technics, we are in danger of becoming the killer robots we want to ban. 
This article aims to contribute to the recognition of these dangers and to begin articulating 
a response. It is a call for legal thinking to discharge its disciplinary role within a broader 
philosophical and political battle. If this direction of thought is not prioritised now, the 
powerful forces of double elevation may reduce law to something that is both 
unrecognisable and all too recognisable.  
 
 
 
